T HERE ARE at least two useful approaches to an ethical critique of the criteria of just wars. One is to start from basic ethical principles and to ask what criteria of just wars can be derived from them. The other is to start from the just-war criteria that we have inherited and to criticize them in terms of consistency, coherence, and fidelity to fundamental ethical principles and values. Within either approach we move back and forth between our practices, including our ordinary judgments, and ethical principles and theories.
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THEOLOGICAL STUDIES the content of the particular obligations (not to injure or kill others) that the justification of war must override.
First, let us consider the notion of a prima-facie obligation or duty (which I use interchangeably in this context). W. D. Ross introduced the distinction between prima-facie and actual obligations to account for conflicts of obligations (which he thought to be "nonexistent" when fully and carefully analyzed). When two or more prima-facie obligations appear to come into conflict, we have to assess the total situation including various possible courses of actions with all their features of prima-facie lightness and wrongness to determine what we actually ought to do. The phrase "prima facie" indicates that certain features of acts that have a tendency to make an act right or wrong claim our attention; insofar as an act has those features, it is right or wrong. But our actual obligation depends on the act in its wholeness and entirety. For "while an act may well be prima facie obligatory in respect of one character and prima facie forbidden in virtue of another, it becomes obligatory or forbidden only in virtue of the totality of its ethically relevant characteristics."
8 Although some prima-facie obligations are more stringent than others (e.g., nonmaleficence is more stringent than beneficence), it is not possible to provide a complete ranking or a scale of stringency of obligations.
To hold that an obligation or duty is prima-facie is to claim that it always has a strong moral reason for its performance, although this reason may not always be decisive or triumph over all other reasons. If an obligation is viewed as absolute, it cannot be overridden under any circumstances; it has priority over all other obligations with which it might come into conflict. If it is viewed as relative, the rule stating it is no more than a maxim or rule of thumb that illuminates but does not prescribe what we ought to do. If it is viewed as prima-facie, it is intrinsically binding, but it does not necessarily determine one's actual obligation.
As individuals or members of institutions, we have a prima-facie duty not to injure others. Injury may mean an unwarranted or unjustified harm or violation of rights, or it may mean inflicting actual harm (e.g., shooting someone) which may or may not be warranted or justified. In the first sense, it is, of course, always wrong by definition; an obligation not to injure others wrongfully would be absolute rather than primafacie. In the second sense, it is prima-facie. Insofar as an act injures another, it is prima-facie wrong and stands in need of justification. Although Joseph Fletcher and others imply that killing (which I am treating for the moment under injury) is morally neutral, William Frankena rightly insists that some kinds of action (including killing) are "intrinsically wrong." For they are always prima facie wrong, and they are always actually wrong when they are not justified on other moral grounds. They are not in themselves morally indifferent. They may conceivably be justified in certain situations, but they always need to be justified; and even when they are justified, there is still one moral point against them.
9
If the Fifth (or Sixth) Commandment means "Thou shalt not kill," it is prima-facie rather than absolute; for the Hebrews admitted killing in selfdefense, capital punishment, and war. If it means "Thou shalt not commit murder," it can then be taken as absolute, but it leaves open the question which killings are to be counted as murder.
10
It is not necessary to defend Ross's intuitionism in order to hold that injury and killing are intrinsically prima-facie wrong. For Ross, both fall under the obligation of nonmaleficence. For Rawls, there is a "natural duty" (i.e., owed to persons generally) not to injure or harm others and not to inflict unnecessary suffering; this natural duty can be derived from the original position.
11 Christian theologians might derive this obligation not to injure or kill others from the norm of agape. The claim that injury and killing are prima-facie wrong is thus compatible with a number of philosophical and religious frameworks.
An overridden or outweighed prima-facie obligation continues to function in the situation and the course of action one adopts. It leaves what Robert Nozick calls "moral traces." It has "residual effects" on the agent's attitudes and actions. As A. C. Ewing suggests, If I have a prima facie obligation which I cannot rightly fulfill because it is overruled by another, stronger prima facie obligation, it does not by any means 9 William K. Frankena, Ethics (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973) 55. Frankena holds that some kinds of acts are "intrinsically prima facie wrong" (55-56). In his article "The Moral Logic of War," Ralph Potter states the presumption against the use of force in two different ways. First, he states that our "common life is sustained by a strong moral and legal presumption against the use of force" (203). Second, he holds that the use of force "always involves an exception to the rule which forbids us to do harm to our neighbor without due cause" (206, my italics). The second statement is faulty; for if the rule forbids us to do harm without due cause, the just-war criteria are designed to establish when there is "due cause." Thus a just war is not an exception to the rule as stated; it is rather built into the rule. 
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THEOLOGICAL STUDIES follow that my conduct ought to be unaffected by the former obligation. Even if I am morally bound to do something inconsistent with it, it should in many cases modify in some respect the way in which the act is performed and in almost all it should affect some subsequent action.
12
For example, if I think that a stronger obligation requires me to break a promise, I should at least explain the situation to the promisee, ask him not to hold me to the promise, apologize for breaking it, and even try to make it up to him later. At the very least, Ewing goes on to say, the prima-facie obligation to keep the promise "should always affect our mental attitude toward the action" to the extent of evoking regret.
13
One important difference between many Protestant and Catholic interpretations of just war appears at this point: the appropriate attitude toward a just war that overrides the prima-facie duty not to injure or kill others. In accord with their belief in the universality of sin, many Protestant theologians such as Reinhold Niebuhr insist that the decision to wage war is always "the lesser of two evils," which they understand as "moral" as well as physical evils. Thus remorse and repentance are proper responses. With St. Augustine they stress that wars should be both just and mournful.
14 Many Catholic theologians, joined by some Protestants, most notably Paul Ramsey, insist that "an act of self-defense or an act of vindictive justice, although imposed by circumstances which are regret- Whether a war that justly and justifiably overrides the prima-facie duty not to injure or kill others should evoke regret or remorse may be debatable, but it not only engenders certain attitudes but other obligations as well. The traces or residual effects of the overridden prima-facie duty are extremely important, as will be clear in my discussion of justwar criteria such as right intention, proportionality, and just conduct.
Before I develop those criteria, I want to summarize and amplify some implications of the prima-facie duty not to injure or kill others; they are actually presuppositions of many just-war theories that include both jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
First, because it is prima-facie wrong to injure or kill others, such acts demand justification. There is a presumption against their justification, and anyone who tries to justify them bears a heavy burden of proof.
Second, because not all duties can be fulfilled in every situation without some sacrifices (this inability may be understood as natural or as the result of sin), it is necessary and legitimate to override some prima-facie duties. Some other duties may be more stringent and thus take priority over the duty not to injure others-for instance, the prima-facie duty to uphold justice or to protect the innocent. War thus can be a moral undertaking in some circumstances.
Third, the overridden prima-facie duties should affect the actors' attitudes and what they do in waging the war. Some ways of waging war are more compatible than others with the overridden prima-facie duties not to injure or kill others. War can be more or less humane and civilized. War and politics, or peace, are not two totally separate realms or periods.
16
Both are subject to moral principles and rules, and, indeed, to many of 1977: The Church in Dispute," TS 38 [1978] 103). They also hold that nonmoral evils (e.g., killings) are to be avoided as far as possible, but admit that such evils may be justified in conflicts of values and disvalues. Such conflicts may give rise to regret but not to moral remorse. The proportionalists are suspicious of the language of intrinsic evil because of the way it has been used in some recent theological and magisterial literature (e.g., to hold that direct sterilization is wrong regardless of the circumstances), because it seems more at home in a deontological than a teleological setting, and because it is confusing. As I understand the debate, my argument is not as close to the position taken by the proportionalists (such as McCormick, Schüller, Janssens, and Fuchs) as to the position developed by Albert R. Di Ianni, S.M., in "The Direct/Indirect Distinction in Morals," Thomist 41 (1977) 350-80. Di Ianni distinguishes nonmoral evil (e.g., death) from the free causation of that evil (e.g., homicide). The latter has "at least minimal moral meaning in itself prior to consideration of intention and circumstances." Thus, Di Ianni construes concepts such as homicide as "bearers of a negative moral meaning (as intrinsically evil in a weak sense) and not merely as bearers of negative ontic or pre-moral meaning." This weak sense of "intrinsically evil" (which he also calls the prima-facie moral meaning of negative acts in the tradition of Ross) implies that the negative moral ought is always relevant but it is not always decisive. Even when an action that is prima-facie or intrinsically evil is justified in particular circumstances, it should engender "creative regret" but not guilt. 16 Paul Ramsey, The Just War 55, 142, 143, 475, and passim.
the same principles and rules. War ought to fall within many of the boundaries that are also important in peace. Theorists and practitioners are commonly tempted to make war merely an extension of politics, so that it requires very little to justify waging war; or they are tempted to make politics and war so discontinuous that once one enters the state of war, previously important moral, political, and legal considerations become irrelevant. Two points need to be affirmed. On the one hand, war must be justified because it violates some of our prima-facie obligations, not because it is totally immoral or amoral or utterly discontinuous with politics; on the other hand, it can be more or less humane insofar as it is conducted in accord with some standards that derive from the overridden prima-facie obligations and other obligations that endure even in war. Furthermore, however much continuity there is between peace and war, peace remains the ultimate aim of a just war.
A model of war as a rule-governed activity stands in sharp contrast to a model of war as hell, which is accepted by most pacifists and by many "realists" who recognize no restraints other than proportionality. Both models are evident in the following passage from Rolf Hochhuth's play Soldiers:
Bishop Bell of Chichester: "We denigrate our men if we suggest that they require directives to tell them that the burning of defenseless persons is murder." P.M. (savagely, not looking at Bell): "War is murder. The murderer is the man who fires first. That man is Hitler."
According to one view, war is hell, murder, and there is thus only the crime of war, within which anything goes, for "all's fair " According to another view, war is a game-like (not in a frivolous sense) or a rulegoverned conflict, within which one may legitimately injure, kill, and destroy, but not commit war crimes such as injuring or killing defenseless persons who are noncombatants or excombatants. 17 For the view that war is "total" and without limits, the only critical moral factor is the decision to wage war, and moral blameworthiness may attach to the side starting the war, sometimes even to the side firing the first shot. For the view that war is a rule-governed activity, the jus in bello becomes very important. Any adequate theory, however, should not concede that jus ad bellum is unimportant because some moral principles and rules persist in war. There is an important and irreducible difference between peace and war, and for that reason the jus ad bellum remains indispensable.
That difference, however, is not equivalent to the difference between morality and amorality or immorality.
GROUNDS OF JUST-WAR CRITERIA
Most of the criteria traditionally associated with just-war theories emerge because war involves a conflict between prima-facie obligations (when it is just and justified) and because the overridden prima-facie obligations forbid us to injure and kill others. Many of these criteria apply in other areas, as I have suggested, because of similar conflicts between prima-facie obligations, not because the prima-facie obligations not to injure or kill others are involved at every point. Nevertheless, the content of the prima-facie obligations that are overruled in just wars certainly shapes the criteria, particularly those having to do with jus in bello, since the conduct of the war should be as compatible as possible with the overridden prima-facie obligations.
The first criterion of a just war is right or legitimate authority, which is really a presupposition for the rest of the criteria. In fact, it determines who is primarily responsible for judging whether the other criteria are met. As Quentin Quade indicates, "the principles of Just War become operative only after the classic political question is answered: who should do the judging?"
19 Answering the authority question is a precondition for answering the others; it thus cannot be dismissed as a "secondary criterion." 20 After the proper authority has determined that a war is just and justified and thus overrides the prima-facie obligation not to injure and kill others, citizens, including subject-soldiers, face a different presumption. Whereas the proper authority has to confront and rebut the presumption against war, the subject-soldier now confronts the presumption that the war is just and justified because the legitimate authority has so decided in accord with established procedures. 21 In all political orders the subject has a moral right/duty-although not a legal right-not to fight if the war is manifestly unjust. And in a democracy the citizen is ruler as well as subject and thus has a greater responsibility to apply these criteria to war. As subject, however, his presumption ought to be that the authorities, if they are legitimate and have followed proper procedures, have decided correctly.
The requirement of a just cause is simply the requirement that the other competing prima-facie duty or obligation be a serious and weighty one: e.g., to protect the innocent from unjust attack, to restore rights wrongfully denied, or to reestablish a just order. Because war involves overriding important prima-facie obligations not to injure or kill others, it demands the most weighty and significant reasons.
These obligations cannot, however, be overridden if there are other ways of achieving the just aim short of war. War is the ultima ratio, the last resort. The requirement that war be the last resort does not mean that all possible measures have to be attempted and exhausted if there is no reasonable expectation that they will be successful. Nor does it necessarily mean that the side that first resorts to armed force should be condemned.
22
Insofar as a formal declaration is sometimes required, it stems not only from the nature of political society, but also from the requirement that war be the last resort. Ultimata or formal declarations of war "are the last measures of persuasion short of force itself."
23 Although a formal declaration of war may not be appropriate for various reasons, the significance of this criterion, broadly understood, should not be underestimated. Conceding that the best publicists differed on the necessity of a declaration, Francis Lieber defended it because "decent regard for mankind" and "public good faith" require that a government explain and justify its departure from peace. 24 A failure to announce the intention of and the reasons for waging war is a failure to exercise the responsibility of explaining and justifying exceptional action to those involved, including the citizens of one's own country, the enemy, and third parties who have to decide how to respond. An announcement of intentions and explanation of reasons may be more appropriate than a formal declaration of war.
The requirements of reasonable hope of success and proportionality are closely related. If war has no reasonable chance of success, it is clearly imprudent. But more than a dictate of prudence is involved in the demand for a reasonable hope of success. If none of the just and serious ends, none of the other prima-facie obligations, could be realized or fulfilled through the war, a nation should reconsider its policy, which, after all, involves overriding stringent prima-facie obligations. Nevertheless, numerous qualifications are in order. This criterion applies more clearly to offensive than to defensive wars. And in any war success may be broader than "victory." As Lieber wrote of John Brown's raid, it was irrational, but it will be historical! Success could include witnessing to values as well as achieving goals; for instance, a group might engage in resistance in order to retain self-respect even in its demise. the prima-facie duties not to injure or kill others, duties as binding on states as on individuals.
Regarding proportionality, Ramsey writes:
It can never be right to resort to war, no matter how just the cause, unless a proportionality can be established between military/political objectives and their price, or unless one has reason to believe that in the end more good will be done than undone or a greater measure of evil prevented. But, of all the tests for judging whether to resort to or to participate in war, this one balancing an evil or good effect against another is open to the greatest uncertainty. This, therefore, establishes rather than removes the possibility of conscientious disagreement among prudent men.
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Here too defensive measures are less restricted than offensive ones, but this criterion includes the welfare of all countries and peoples and not merely one's own country. Certainly the weight of the cause and the probability of success enter the discussion of proportionality, but the probable negative consequences must also be considered-even beyond the negative feature of injuring or killing others. The last major criterion of the jus ad bellum is right or just intention (which along with proportionality is very important in particular battles, engagements, and acts within war and not merely for the war as a whole). For the war as a whole, right intention is shaped by the pursuit of a just cause. But it also encompasses motives; for example, as St. Augustine and others have insisted, hatred is ruled out. Some would hold that the dominance, if not the mere presence, of hatred vitiates the right to wage war even if there is a just cause. For example, McKenna holds that a "war which is otherwise just becomes immoral if it is waged out of hatred." 27 Such a contention, however, is difficult to establish; for if all the conditions of a just/justified war are met, the presence of vicious motives would not obliterate the jus ad bellum, although they would lead to negative judgments about the agents. Insofar as these vicious motives are expressed in disproportionate force, the infliction of unnecessary suffering, etc., one may condemn the belligerent for violating the jus in bello. Nevertheless, this criterion of right intention understood not merely as pursuit of a just cause but also as proper motives remains significant in part because war is conducted between public, not private, enemies. Furthermore, an attitude of regret, if not remorse, is appropriate when a prima-facie obligation is overridden.
Another interpretation of right intention focuses on peace as the object or end of war. It too bridges the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and I shall emphasize its impact on the conduct of war. St. Augustine and Ramsey, The Just War 195.
McKenna, "Ethics and War" 652.
many others have affirmed that peace is the ultimate object, end, or intention of war. In short, war as injury, killing, and destruction is not an end in itself but a means to another end-a just or better peace. Even apart from the justice that is sought, peace retains its moral claim dining war and thus constitutes an ultimate or final objective. There is a duty to restore the "normal" state of affairs as quickly and surely as possible. It may be dangerous, however, to stress that it is urgent to restore peace, especially if peace is defined as the absence of conflict rather than a specific set of relationships which may include conflict; for such an emphasis may engender support for a brutal and total war, which may undermine the limits set by the jus in bello. Paul Ramsey holds that unless there is a morality that intrinsically limits the conduct of war, "then we must simply admit that war has no limits-since these can hardly be derived from 'peace* as the 'final cause' of just wars. The prima-facie obligation not to injure or kill others should also more directly affect the choice of weapons and methods to fight wars than through the ultimate object of peace. Since this prima-facie obligation is not cancelled even when it is overruled, its impact can be seen in various restrictions of they'll in bello.
First, the immediate object is not to kill or even to injure any particular person but to incapacitate or restrain him. 32 The enemy soldier is not reduced to his role as combatant, and when he surrenders or is wounded, he ceases to be a combatant because he ceases to be a threat. He is now an excombatant. As a prisoner of war, he is entitled to certain protections. As a wounded person, he is entitled to medical treatment equal to that of one's own wounded comrades.
Second, directly to attack noncombatants is not legitimate. This principle is sound even if the distinction between combatant and noncombatant is contextual and thus is partially determined by the society and the type of war. In the gray areas, noncombatants include those persons whose functions in factories and elsewhere serve the needs of the person qua person rather than his or her role as military personnel. Thus, while food is essential for the soldier to function, it is indispensable for him as a human being. And chaplains and medical personnel primarily serve the soldier as human being even when their ministrations indirectly aid the war effort. Finally, indiscriminate methods of warfare are prohibited by this principle.
Third, the original prima-facie obligation not to injure others also excludes inflicting unnecessary suffering. Thus cruelty (inflicting suffering for the sake of suffering) and wanton destruction (destruction without a compelling reason) are wrong. Such acts are not essential to the war effort. Acts that appear to fall under these vague categories of "cruelty" and "wanton destruction" are not cruel or wanton if they are "necessary." The relation between military necessity and such categories is a serious problem area in the jus in bello.
33 At any rate, certain weapons (such as dum-dum bullets and explosive or inflammable projectiles weighing less than 400 grams) are prohibited because they are calculated to cause "unnecessary suffering" or "superfluous injury." The rationale is simple. An ordinary rifle bullet or a projectile weighing less than 400 grams is designed to incapacitate only one person. To make the bullet or projectile do more damage to that one person is to inflict suffering that is unnecessary or superfluous. course, not all suffering that offers military advantage is necessary and justified.) Fourth, even the indirect, incidental, or obliquely intentional effects on civilians must be justified by the principle of proportion.
I have not tried to offer an exhaustive list of the requirements of the jus in bello, but rather to show that some restrictions emerge from the continued pressure of the prima-facie duty not to injure or kill others even when it is overridden by the jus ad bellum. That duty persists and imposes restrictions indirectly through the ultimate object of peace and directly as in the protection of certain classes, avoidance of unnecessary suffering, and care for combatants who are hors de combat.
APPLICATION OF CRITERIA: ORDER AND PRIORITIES
Some issues of order and priorities emerged when I examined the way some criteria derive from or relate to others and especially the overridden prima-facie duty not to injure or kill others. But there are other issues also inadequately addressed by contemporary just-war theorists. I want to identify some of them without attempting to resolve them: When public officials or citizens apply these criteria to particular wars, should they apply them in any particular order? Do some criteria have more weight than others? Is a serial ordering possible?
A good place to start is with the question, what makes a war unjust and/or unjustified? Because medieval just-war theorists were mainly interested in the question whether and when Christians could participate in war, they focused on the criteria for just wars and did "not really analyse an unjust war except as a mirror image of a just war."
35 For different reasons, contemporary theorists also focus on just wars and neglect some of the issues that might emerge if they asked when a war is unjust and/or unjustified. How can one recognize an unjust and/or unjustified war? Some argue that meeting each criterion is necessary for a just war; each is necessary and all are collectively sufficient. Thus the inability to meet any single criterion, such as last resort, renders a war unjust.
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A second possible approach would hold that a just war must "more or less" meet or approximate the criteria. No particular criterion is absolutely necessary, but at least several must be met for a war to be just and justified. While such an approach is probably the closest to the way citizens and policy-makers reason, it does not indicate what degree of approximation is sufficient to make a war just and justified. A third approach would offer a serial or lexical ordering of the criteria, so that some must be met before others can even be considered. While the first approach requires that each criterion be met and the second one requires only that some be met, both apply the criteria en bloc. The third approach, however, might hold that "just cause" is an indispensable and fundamental criterion that must be satisfied before one can even consider proportionality. While this approach may have the same outcome as the first one, the order of consideration is important.
A fourth approach could consider all or some of the criteria as establishing prima-facie duties, which would then follow the logic already sketched in this essay.
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A fifth approach could consider the criteria as "rules of thumb" or "maxims" that identify some morally relevant considerations. We do not start our reflection about war de novo, but rather begin with these traditional maxims that illuminate but do not prescribe what we ought to do. While a war is just and justified if it produces the greatest good, these maxims are useful in identifying relevant factors to put on the scale.
These five approaches obviously do not exhaust the possibilities; indeed, several combinations are possible. Nevertheless, they indicate some of the ambiguities in current just-war theories. Although it is possible to make some general points about the order of the criteria on the basis of the prima-facie obligations that are involved (as I tried to do in the order I employed in the preceding section), the order and weight of the criteria will finally be determined for any particular theory by substantive views of justice and other moral principles and values, modes of moral reasoning, etc. Many recent attempts to restate just-war criteria apparently consider them to be questions that policy-makers ought to consider. Without some substantive beliefs, they can say only "consider justice," "consider how much success is possible," "balance the benefits and costs," etc. Thus the criteria would constitute a formal framework for moral debates about the use of force. Perhaps because they are empty, they can serve to organize and orchestrate disputes in the public arena; even pacifists could and did use these criteria to condemn the war in Vietnam. While this function of the criteria should not be disparaged, it is hardly what traditional theorists expected; for they developed their criteria within substantive theories of justice and the common good.
Paul Ramsey prefers to translate justum bellum as "justified war" rather than "just war," in part because he does not think that a substantive theory of justice in relation to ends can be developed or that one side can legitimately claim justice while denying it to the other. 38 Such an approach fits with a formal understanding of these criteria. When a policy-maker raises these formal questions of the jus ad bellum and gets affirmative answers, resort to war is "justified" although we cannot say that it is "just." A procedural justification is possible even when we lack a substantive theory of justice. Ramsey is more willing to provide content for jus in bello at least in terms of a principle of discrimination that rules out direct attacks on noncombatants. Indeed, he says very little about jus ad bellum, concentrating instead on jus in bello.
Many classic and contemporary theorists have construed "just cause" to include last resort, reasonable chance of success, and proportionality.
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A nation does not have a just cause unless these other conditions are also met. Nonetheless, one way to use the just/justified distinction is to restrict the language of "justice" to war's cause or aim and then to determine whether the war is "justified" by reference to the other criteria, including last resort, reasonable chance of success, and proportionality. While a war may be "unjust," according to this approach, when its cause does not satisfy standards of justice, it is "unjustified" when it does not meet the other criteria. It is important to emphasize, as Joel Feinberg has pointed out, that one and the same act need not be both just and justified. 40 It may he just and unjustified (e.g., although it renders various parties their due, it violates some other moral principles or results in terrible consequences), or it may be unjust and justified (e.g., an unfair act is required to prevent a disaster). Only when a war is both just and justified does a state have a jus ad bellum.
In addition to the distinction between justice and justification, the distinction between rights and right conduct, or between rights and their exercise, may be useful, particularly in construing the relation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. 41 success without fighting the war unjustly and unfairly. We might say "You have a right to go to war, but you ought not to exercise that right." Such an approach, however, favors the established military powers. Should a theory of war make it impossible for one country (or revolutionary movement) to wage a "successful" war? Ideological bias and the tension between moral requirements and success must be confronted clearly and honestly. Does the jus ad bellum establish only a right or also a duty to go to war (at least under certain circumstances)? Because the language of duty can lead to or support crusades and holy wars, it is somewhat suspect. There is no prima-facie duty to go to war (i.e., to injure and kill), but because some other prima-facie duties (e.g., to protect the innocent) may override the prima-facie duty not to injure or kill, there may be an actual duty to fight, especially in a situation where the language of necessity seems appropriate. To say that war stands in need of justification because it violates certain prima-facie duties is not to rule out the language of actual duty or obligation in a particular set of circumstances. To think of some wars as duties does not entail modifying or relaxing the jus in bello. Even a policeman who has a duty to try to stop an escaped criminal who has taken hostages still must respect certain moral and legal limits.
Finally, what degree of certitude should policy-makers and citizens have about the justice/justification of a particular war? Should they be convinced that the preponderance of the evidence indicates that the war is just/justified according to the above criteria? Or should they be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt?
This essay has attempted to show how traditional just-war criteria can be interpreted and defended in relation to a prima-facie duty not to injure and kill others. Both the notion of a prima-facie duty and the content of the duty not to injure and kill others illuminate the just-war criteria which are analogous to the criteria we use whenever we cannot fulfil all the claims upon us. An overridden prima-facie duty should continue to have an impact on the actors' attitudes and actions, for example, on the jus in bello which also expresses other enduring duties and obligations. Finally, I identified several unresolved issues in the application of justwar criteria, particularly their order, priorities, and weight. Theorists of just wars need to pay more attention to numerous issues including the bases, interrelations, and functions of their criteria. Otherwise they will appear merely to posit traditional criteria without foundation and coherence. Of course, such issues constitute only part of the total agenda for just-war theorists in this age. Other critical issues of relevance and application also require attention, but they cannot be adequately ad-
